- The Buddha does not explain why one should be moral; he shows that immorality is a by-product of reification—where we imagine a self in all things.
- When subject and object are both seen as empty of self, morality/immorality is not overcome but rendered impossible—there is no self that is grasping and no essence that is being grasped as “mine”.
- Grasping is the attempt of an imagined self to unify itself with an imagined object, and the entire moral problem arises from that error.
Morality as pedagogical scaffolding
This reframes the entire ethical project so that the objective is not moral behaviour, the target is realising there is no self that has to be moral:
- Conventional morality (sīla) is the scaffolding you need while the building is under construction, it is not to be abandoned while you are practicing
- Insight into emptiness (paññā) completes the building/practice
- The scaffolding is then removed—because it’s no longer needed; the structure it was supporting is now standing on its own, practice is over
Morality as Lubricant, Not Punishment
In the Pali Canon, the Buddha explains morality in terms of how it aids meditation and practice rather than as a way to manage personal karma so that future lives are more likely to be pleasant. His message is primarily to use morality because it benefits in this life, not to avoid later punishment or to secure future rewards.
While the Buddha does invoke karma to explain why beings find themselves in better or worse circumstances, this explanation is rarely used as admonition or praise for actions in past lives. Instead, morality is integrated into the path as a practical condition for clarity and freedom here and now.
Morality in the Suttas
In the Nikāyas, morality (sīla) is instrumental and functional. Its primary roles are:
- removing remorse that arises from moral indiscretions
- calming verbal and bodily disturbances associated with immorality
- supporting samādhi by that reduction in disturbance
- using disciplined restraint to weaken self‑construction thinking
Liberation is achieved through present‑moment causal clarity, not through moral accounting that tallies up good and bad karma. While the Buddha does mention karmic results, they are rarely used to motivate practice, and he does not present karma as a mechanism that by itself frees the mind.
The Abhidharma Changes the Framework
The Abhidharma shifts the weighting, which in turn alters the moral frame. While the suttas emphasise present‑moment function, the Abhidharma gives greater weight to future lives as part of moral practice.
Actions (kamma‑patha) are treated as discrete units classified as wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, with fixed valence and results. Ethical quality is intrinsic to the mental event (citta and cetasikas) that produces it, rather than dependent on context, intention‑flow, or lived experience.
This transforms morality into a systematised and ritualised activity, rather than a purely functional condition for liberation. Even though Abhidharma authors deny divine judgment, the way they structure karma makes it feel like moral retribution. Its impersonality feels judgmental.
The Suttas’ “removal of remorse → joy → samādhi” sequence is displaced
The suttas’ most psychologically precise account of morality’s function is typified in AN 11.1. “What disturbs the mind now?”—becomes secondary to the Abhidharma’s “What will this produce later?”
Its karmic residue (kamma‑santāna), stored potentialities (bīja), resultants (vipāka‑citta), and other mechanisms may be philosophically sophisticated, but the result is a shift toward a devotional orientation. This shift may not be intentional, but it produces an unmistakable moralisation not found in the suttas.
Although Abhidharma authors explicitly deny any higher authority or intervening agent, the traditions shaped by Abhidharma nevertheless result in widespread devotional practices aimed at influencing karmic outcomes—through merit transfer, ritual acts, and appeals to awakened beings.
If intervention were genuinely impossible, such practices would have no intelligible function. Their persistence suggests a structural implication within the system itself: by fixing moral valence and outcomes while abstracting agency into impersonal mechanisms, the Abhidharma framework generates pressure for an appeal mechanism that its philosophy officially disavows.
Devotion emerges not from doctrine, but as a compensatory response to moral consequences that feel judgmental even though they posit no judge.
Systematisation Requires Stabilised Valence
Once they have built a total explanatory system, ethical valence cries out to be stabilised or the system is threatened with collapse.
The suttas avoid this by staying pragmatic and context‑sensitive. By systematising the Buddha’s pragmatic account of ethical restraint, the Abhidharma reinterprets morality primarily through karmic causation. This reorients the emphasis from morality’s immediate psychological and liberative function—central in the suttas—toward a framework of moral accounting that later supports devotional and punitive interpretations.
This devotional/punitive turn is fully realised later, in commentaries, cosmological elaborations, and merit‑transfer cultures. Abhidharma supplied the grammar that made that turn possible. Without Abhidharma, that move would have been far harder to justify.
Mahayana Has a Contextual View that Aligns with the Suttas
Rather than a hard stance that actions create definite karmic results, Mahayana lays great store on intention or motivation as influencing karma. The Pali suttas have this kind of plasticity. They do so explicitly through intention (cetanā).
“Cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi.”
“Monks, it is intention that I call karma.” (AN 6.63)
This frames karma as ethically charged at the moment of intending and thus not reducible to bodily or verbal motion as such. Karma is determined by the intention before the act, not by the act itself. In the suttas the same external act can have different karmic weight–omission, restraint, or failed action can still be karmically potent, but accidental harm is explicitly de-moralised.
Motivation modulates gravity, not just category
Across the Nikāyas, intention is not binary but graded–premeditated vs. impulsive, sustained vs. momentary, it is affected by being accompanied by wrong view vs. right view.
This means karmic fruition is not mechanically determined by act-type. The suttas repeatedly show the Buddha reclassifying acts once motivation is examined.
Why Abhidhamma feels different
Classical Abhidhamma does not deny intention, but it atomises it into momentary mental factors that are discrete rather than continuously unbounded, embedding it in a highly regulated causal grid that shifts emphasis from ethical phenomenology to ontological accounting.
The result is a flattening effect that packages the action with its intention presupposed, making it look determinative. The fluid context of the suttas becomes a taxonomy for easy moral evaluation that invites certain judgement rather than tolerance or flexibility.
Mahāyāna is not innovating here—it’s amplifying
Mahayāna’s bodhicitta, dedication (pariṇāmanā), and adherence to intention overriding action is best read as a re-foregrounding of a sutta principle, not a departure from it.
What Mahāyāna does add is a longer karmic horizon and a more explicit link between motivation and non-reification through its view of emptiness.
Mahāyāna’s contribution is real but continuous
Mahāyāna’s innovation is less about logic and more about scope and framing:
- Bodhicitta as meta-intention: By making the welfare of all beings the overriding frame, Mahāyāna creates a context where conventional transgressions can be overridden—not because rules don’t matter, but because the governing intention is so vast it can absorb apparent violations (the skilled means / upāya-kauśalya literature).
- Pariṇāmanā (dedication of merit): This explicitly treats karmic results as malleable and redirectable post-action, which is more overt than anything in the Nikāyas but arguably continuous with the suttas’ emphasis on present mental state determining outcome.
- Emptiness as karmic solvent: By denying intrinsic nature to both act and agent, Mahāyāna undercuts any residual essentialism about karma. Acts don’t bear inherent karmic charges; karma is relational, contingent, empty. This is philosophically more explicit than the suttas but arguably follows from dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) taken seriously.
But the ethical logic itself is already present in the Nikāyas.
The Pāli suttas have full karmic plasticity, they do not treat karma as act-determinist. The tension is best described as sutta pragmatics vs. Abhidhamma systematisation.
Morality as lubricant rather than punishment – intention is what makes morality functional now, not a cosmic bookkeeping device.
1. Bāhiya Sutta (Ud 1.10) — morality never appears at all
“In the seen, there is only the seen…
When for you there is only this,
then there is no ‘you’ in terms of that.
When there is no ‘you’ in terms of that,
you are neither here nor beyond nor in between.
This alone is the end of suffering.”
What is striking is not what is said, but what is absent:
no injunction
no virtue
no restraint
no karmic calculus
Once “you” drops out of the perceptual field, nothing remains that could be moral or immoral.
This is not higher morality.
It is the end of the moral frame.
2. Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta (SN 22.59) — agency evaporates
The Buddha’s argument is not “you should not cling” but:
if it were self, it would obey
it does not obey
therefore it cannot be owned
Once ownership collapses:
responsibility as metaphysical burden collapses
blame and praise lose footing
action becomes impersonal unfolding
The sutta does not replace self with duty, it leaves nothing in its place.
This is why liberation is described as disenchantment, not righteousness.
3. SN 12.15 (Kaccānagotta) — morality dies with ontology
“This world, Kaccāna, mostly depends on a duality — existence and non-existence…
But for one who sees dependent arising, there is no notion of existence;
for one who sees cessation, there is no notion of non-existence.”
Ethics presupposes something that exists enough to obligate.
Once both existence and non-existence are dismantled:
norms cannot land
transgression cannot occur
obligation has no object
What remains is functional responsiveness, not moral law.
Why these texts are dangerous (and are thus reinterpreted)
These suttas are rarely allowed to stand on their own because:
they undercut moral realism
they dissolve “should”
they make rule-based ethics redundant
So later traditions:
reinsert virtue language
reinterpret them as “advanced practice”
or fence them off as exceptional
But taken at face value, they say exactly what we are saying.
The Abhidhamma’s value shouldn’t be dismissed
While Abhidhamma systematisation can feel mechanistic, it served important functions:
- Pedagogical clarity: For monastics needing practical ethical guidance, having clear categories was useful
- Preserving nuance: The 89 or 121 types of consciousness in Abhidhamma actually do preserve gradations—just in a different idiom
- Anti-nihilism: In contexts where karmic skepticism was prevalent, a robust ontology of mental factors helped counter “nothing matters” views
The tension isn’t necessarily that Abhidhamma is wrong, but that it optimises for different concerns (precision, systematisation, doctrinal defense) than the suttas (pragmatic training, contextual wisdom, awakening).
